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Abstract
This article investigates the shortsightedness or myopia of recent climate and energy policy (CEP) in the EU. To this end,
it develops and applies a measurement tool of short‐termism composed of four key criteria: (1) the reflection of science‐
based long‐term thinking in the policy process and its output; (2) the degree to which mid‐term greenhouse gas emission
targets and accompanying policies align with science‐based long‐term objectives; (3) the stringency of the legislation; and
(4) its adaptability. We use these criteria to assess the levels of short‐termism of the EU’s 2020 and 2030 CEP frameworks
and the (still evolving) European Green Deal (EGD). Overall, we find that the level of myopia of EU CEP has fluctuated and
has advanced far less than the development of the nominal mid‐term emission targets might suggest. The EGD’s 55% emis‐
sion reduction target for 2030 only constitutes a return to the levels of alignment with science‐based long‐term objectives
existing in the 2020 Package (making good on the regression of the 2030 Framework). It is primarily due to the maturing
of long‐term thinking and a ratcheting mechanism, that EU climate policy under the EGD can be considered less myopic
than the 2020 Package (although the assessment remains preliminary pending the adoption of further implementing legis‐
lation). These findings lay the ground for future research that not only investigates reasons for the general myopia of (EU)
climate policy, but also the drivers of the fluctuations over time.
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myopia
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Climate Governance and the European Green Deal in Turbulent Times” edited by Claire
Dupont (Ghent University, Belgium) and Diarmuid Torney (Dublin City University, Ireland).
© 2021 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu‐
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
In the twenty‐first century, the EU has significantly devel‐
oped its climate and energy policy (CEP), most notably
through several policy packages. The 2020 Climate and
Energy Package (2020 Package), adopted in 2009, estab‐
lished and implemented a greenhouse gas (GHG) emis‐
sion reduction target of 20% by 2020. In 2018, the 2030
Climate and Energy Policy Framework (2030 Framework)
revised this target to 40% by 2030. In the last step so far,
the European Climate Law adopted under the European
Green Deal (EGD) in 2021, upgraded the 2030 mitiga‐
tion target to 55% (while further implementing legis‐
lation is forthcoming) to better align the EU’s commit‐
ments with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement,
namely, to limit the increase of global average tempera‐
ture to 2 °C or even 1.5 °C compared with pre‐industrial
times. Over the same timeframe, the EU’s long‐term tar‐
get has also evolved from a political commitment to
reducing GHG emissions by 80–95% by 2050 made in
2009 to a binding target of climate neutrality or net‐
zero emissions by 2050 enshrined in the Climate Law.
In parallel with advancing its emission targets, the EU has
also developed the surrounding legislative framework,
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including the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) cov‐
ering the power and industry sectors, an Effort Sharing
among member states regarding the non‐ETS sectors,
the Renewable Energy Directive, the Energy Efficiency
Directive and more (on EU CEP and its evolution, see
e.g., Boasson & Wettestad, 2013; Delbeke & Vis, 2019;
Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020).
A rich literature has explored various aspects of
EU CEP. Amongst several themes, scholars have anal‐
ysed: the development of EU climate policy, its imple‐
mentation and effectiveness, its ambition, its innova‐
tion, the EU’s role as an international climate leader, and
individual climate policy instruments and packages (e.g.,
Boasson &Wettestad, 2013; Burns, 2019; Dupont, 2016;
Rayner & Jordan, 2016). This is not the place for a com‐
prehensive review of the achievements and shortcom‐
ings of this literature and its many branches. Rather, we
note that hardly any contributions to this literature have,
as of yet, diachronically assessed to what extent EU CEP,
and its mid‐term targets and related policy frameworks
in particular, has been in line with scientifically‐derived
long‐term objectives.
Beyond the literature on EU CEP, scholars have inves‐
tigated the role of time in climate politics. Short‐term
time horizons and the focus on immediate interests
form a key component of the conceptualization of cli‐
mate change as a “superwicked problem,” having so far
led to largely inadequate climate policies (Levin et al.,
2012). Similarly, Hovi et al. (2009) have argued that the
time inconsistency between short‐term costs of climate
policies and long‐term benefits resulting from them,
impedes effective climate protection. Hence, temporal
asymmetries between short‐term policy action (“politi‐
cal time,” e.g., electoral cycles or dynamics of interna‐
tional institutions) and long‐term impacts (“deep time,”
geological timescales) hamper climate decision‐making
(Galaz, 2019). Furthermore, literature on “democratic
myopia” has explored the shortsightedness of politics
more generally (and only partially with respect to cli‐
mate policy; see Cseh, 2019) as resulting from the insti‐
tutional structures of contemporary democratic politi‐
cal systems (see Finnegan, 2019) and associated behav‐
ioral mechanisms and short‐term interests (e.g., Jacobs,
2016; Mackenzie, 2016). In line with the problem ana‐
lysis, these diverse contributions explore similar poten‐
tial solutions, namely adapting the design of (climate)
policies (to strengthen their path dependency; see Levin
et al., 2012) and the institutional structures of political
systems (e.g., reinforcing the agonistic aspects of democ‐
racy, as in Machin, 2019; turning to deliberative forms
of democracy, as in Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2019; or even
potentially constraining democracies, as in Beckman,
2008). Surprisingly, however, few contributions to the
mentioned literatures have empirically examined the
degree of shortsightedness or “myopia” of climate policy
as a key foundation for investigating the reasons for such
myopia and possible remedies. Additionally, myopia liter‐
ature has, so far, remained focused on the national level.
As a result, any changes of the level of myopia over time
or the presence of myopia at the EU level have hardly
been explored.
Against this backdrop, this article examines the
level of myopia/shortsightedness (or farsightedness) of
EU CEP from the 2020 Package to the EGD. How myopic
has EU CEP been, and has its level of short‐ or farsight‐
edness changed over time? Investigating these ques‐
tions promises to make a twofold contribution to the
aforementioned scholarship. First, it offers a fresh sys‐
tematic assessment of EU CEP which advances on the
established focus on ambition by taking a long‐term per‐
spective that pays particular attention to intertemporal
trade‐offs. Second, our analysis proposes an approach to
the systematic investigation/determination of the level
of myopia of (climate) policy as an essential basis for
research on temporal asymmetries, time inconsistencies
and “democratic” myopia. This provides the ground for
systematic comparisons across countries and time as
an important basis for advancing explanatory analyses,
which we have to leave for future research.
We argue that EU CEP has, overall, remained short‐
sighted, but with significant variation over time and
across different criteria. Our assessment indicates that
the myopia of EU CEP has declined far less than the
development of the nominal mid‐term emission reduc‐
tion targets—from 20% to 40% to 55%—might suggest.
The 55% target under the EGD only returned to the lev‐
els of the 2020 Package (making good on the regres‐
sion of the 2030 Framework). It is primarily due to the
maturing of long‐term thinking and a ratcheting mech‐
anism, that EU CEP under the EGD can be considered
less myopic than the 2020 Package (although the assess‐
ment remains preliminary pending the adoption of fur‐
ther implementing legislation).
In the following, we develop our argument in three
steps. The next section first lays out our framework for
assessing the level of myopia of EU CEP featuring four
key criteria. Subsequently, we apply these criteria to
appraise the level of myopia of EU CEP from the 2020
Package over the 2030 Framework to the evolving EGD.
Lastly, we discuss the main findings, draw conclusions
and look ahead to follow‐up research.
2. Myopia of EU Climate Policy: Assessment
Framework
Building on the relevant literature, we suggest four key
criteria for assessing the level of myopia of EU CEP over
time. We propose to investigate to what extent: (1) a
long‐term perspective in line with science was explicitly
reflected in the legislative process and its output; (2) the
mid‐term emission reduction targets and accompany‐
ing policies have been in line with long‐term objectives
in accordance with science; (3) the governance frame‐
work has been “stringent” in demanding actors to adapt
their behavior; and (4) ratcheting mechanisms for fur‐
ther developing mitigation targets and the governance
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framework in line with science (adaptability) have been
included. Overall, we consider myopia a property of a
policy (both process and output), hence our focus on
the EU’s legislative documents. While this may connect
to the myopia of actors, investigating the latter would
move towards explanation, which is beyond the scope
of this article and may be part of future research (see
also below).
First, we analyze to what extent a long‐term per‐
spective was reflected in the decision‐making process
and its output. This criterion serves to provide a first
insight into the importance and understanding of the
long term in the legislative process and the resulting
legislation. Three aspects appear to be particularly rele‐
vant in this respect, namely: (1) whether any long‐term
objective is mentioned; (2) whether the mid‐term emis‐
sion reduction target is related to the long‐term tar‐
get and trajectory; and (3) whether the long‐term tar‐
get is derived from science. This third sub‐criterion is
meant to capture the quality of the long‐term perspec‐
tive that is likely to be deficient without a firm basis in
science. To assess these three aspects, we examine the
adopted legislative texts related to the emission reduc‐
tions and their implementation, as well as the legislative
proposal by the European Commission and the positions
expressed by the European Parliament and the Council
of Ministers (and any related pronouncements of the
European Council).
Second, we appraise the degree to which the mid‐
term target pursued closes the gap between a base‐
line scenario and an ideal, farsighted mitigation trajec‐
tory. While the identification of the existing emission
target is straightforward, assessing the other two ref‐
erence values—the baseline and the ideal ambition—
raises important issues (Grant et al., 2020).
The baseline scenario denotes the emission trajec‐
tory toward the relevant target year that was expected
under existing policies prior to the political decision on
the target. The calculation of such a hypothetical emis‐
sion trajectory is not an exact science, not least because
it is based on assumptions about uncertain future devel‐
opments of relevant framework conditions, such as eco‐
nomic growth. Nevertheless, the European Environment
Agency has, since 2003, published the most authorita‐
tive baseline scenarios for the EU (projections with exist‐
ing measures) in its “Trends and Projections” reports.
We thus use these as our baseline scenarios.
At the other end of the spectrum lies the ideal, far‐
sighted ambition of EU mitigation targets. What target
should the EU, according to the latest science at the
time of decision‐making, have aimed at? While science
can advise on which global emission scenarios have a
higher or lower likelihood of ensuring global tempera‐
ture increase stays below 2 °C (or even 1.5 °C), varying
equity or fairness criteria lead to different results as to
the share of individual actors depending on historical
and current responsibility, economic and technological
capabilities, etc. (Hayward, 2012;Williston, 2019). In this
respect, we base our discussion on the principle of “com‐
mon but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities” enshrined in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris
Agreement (Robiou du Pont et al., 2017). Accordingly,
both responsibility and capability need to be considered.
Since, in practice, actors with high historical responsibil‐
ity (e.g., the US and the EU) generally also possess high
capacity tomitigate climate change,we take into account
studies that include both responsibilities and capabilities
or only capabilities, in order to identify scenarios of far‐
sighted ambition.
In assessing the mid‐term target, we additionally
examine relevant accompanying provisions of the pol‐
icy instruments adopted to implement it. Two types of
flexibilities may be considered. First, some provisions
may allow EUmember states to balance over‐and under‐
achievements between them or across time (borrow‐
ing emission allowances from the future, banking past
emission reductions). These flexibilities do not affect the
overall target, but may reduce the likelihood that it is
overachieved. Of greater concern, flexibilities that allow
member states to offset their emissions by domestic or
international carbon removals/credits (e.g., from forests)
de facto reduce and water down the emission reduc‐
tion target (seeMcLaren, 2020). By contrast, accompany‐
ing provisions on renewable energy or energy efficiency
have the potential to provide additional impetus for
emission reductions, potentially leading to overachieve‐
ment of the emission target (despite concerns that they
might interfere with the proper functioning of other pol‐
icy instruments such as the ETS; Rayner & Jordan, 2016).
Beyond the ambition of the target, we examine other
aspects of the policy design of the legislative measures
particularly relevant for myopia. As covering all aspects
of policy design from the policy instrument choice and
policy mixes to design processes and the actors involved
in the policy design (see Howlett & Mukherjee, 2018)
is beyond the scope of this article, we focus on two
components that are particularly pertinent for our pur‐
poses: the stringency and adaptability of the legislation.
A certain degree of stringency or bindingness is required
for the targets to be achieved across different policy
cycles (i.e., electoral cycles or terms of office). Low strin‐
gency would then indicate shortsightedness as the tar‐
gets will be less likely achieved or more likely overturned
or watered down in a following policy cycle. To examine
stringency, we base our assessment on the framework
developed by Oberthür (2019) on the basis of literature
on hard versus soft law as well as the bindingness and
legalization of international governance. He introduces
four criteria: (1) the formal status of the legislation (i.e.,
whether it is formally binding); (2) the nature of the obli‐
gations (i.e., substantive or procedural); (3) the prescrip‐
tiveness and precision of the rules and obligations; and
(4) the means available to promote accountability and
effective implementation (e.g., monitoring and report‐
ing, response to non‐compliance).
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Furthermore, adaptability is required to avoid a lock‐
in of shortsighted policies. The need for mechanisms for
ratcheting and further developing CEP over time arises
because most emission targets and accompanying cli‐
mate governance frameworks have historically remained
deficient (e.g., Climate Action Tracker, 2019). In addition,
new scientific knowledge may emerge, and other devel‐
opments may affect mitigation trajectories. Thus, the
policy framework needs to include mechanisms to regu‐
larly review and strengthen existing targets, as appropri‐
ate, in line with science. As a prime example, the Paris
Agreement includes various provisions that are jointly
referred to as a “ratcheting” or “ambition mechanism”
(Brun, 2016; Torney & O’Gorman, 2020). Key features of
such an ambition mechanism include: (1) the scheduled
regular review and further development of existing tar‐
gets and measures; (2) the orientation towards strength‐
ening (rather than a weakening); and (3) the establish‐
ment of science as a benchmark (Torney & O’Gorman,
2020). Taken together, these elements may, beyond the
emission targets themselves, serve to indicate the extent
to which the governance framework is oriented towards
the long term and farsighted.
Overall, the two criteria of the ambition of mid‐term
targets and the stringency of the related legislative mea‐
sures constitute the substantive core of our assessment
of the myopia of EU CEP over time. They determine the
compatibility of EU CEP with long‐term science‐based
requirements. Whether deliberate or not, lack of com‐
patibility can be interpreted asmyopia/shortsightedness,
unless an appropriate reasoning is provided (e.g., lack
of feasibility of science‐based long‐term requirements).
The existence and design of a ratcheting mechanism
forms a complement as a third criterion to be taken into
account in addition to the two aforementioned ones.
Furthermore, examining whether and how long‐term
considerations have been explicitly reflected in the polit‐
ical process and its output allows us to determine
whether any shortcomings on the other criteria may be
due to the neglect of the long term, result from defi‐
ciencies in the long‐term perspective (e.g., a disregard
of science), or are in fact acknowledged (e.g., as men‐
tioned above, by providing appropriate reasons). Taken
together, the four criteria hence enable us to assess the
myopia of EU CEP over time, including both the sub‐
stance of the policy and the framing of its time horizon.
3. Assessing the EU’s Level of Myopia Over Time
We apply our analytical framework to the main mile‐
stones in the development of EU CEP legislation: the
2020 Package, the 2030 Framework and the EGD. These
overarching legislative frameworks set out the EU’s mid‐
term GHG emission reduction targets, which have been
divided into a target for the sectors covered by the
ETS Directive (principally industry and power) and a tar‐
get for the non‐ETS sectors (including transport, build‐
ings, and agriculture) covered by the Effort Sharing
Decision/Regulation. While the overall targets relate to
1990 as the baseline, the ETS and non‐ETS targets are cal‐
ibrated against 2005, for which verified data are available
(Delbeke & Vis, 2019). Other key elements of the afore‐
mentioned legislative frameworks include the Renewable
Energy (RE) Directive, the Energy Efficiency (EE) Directive
and, newly introduced in the 2030 Framework, the
Regulations on Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
(LULUCF) and on the Governance of the Energy Union
and Climate Action (hereafter Governance Regulation;
Delreux & Happaerts, 2016; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020).
As the legislation of the EGD is still under develop‐
ment at the time of writing, the assessment focuses on
the European Climate Law that (among other things)
enshrines both a strengthened 2030 emission target and
climate neutrality by 2050 in law.
3.1. 2020 Package
Adopted in 2008/2009, the 2020 Package established
the EU’s target of a 20% GHG emission reduction by
2020 compared to 1990. To implement this target, the
ETS Directive and the Effort Sharing Decision aimed to
reduce GHG emissions in their respective sectors by
21% and 10% (compared to 2005; EU, 2009a, 2009c).
Additionally, the RE Directive established binding mem‐
ber state targets towards increasing the share of RE
in the EU’s final energy consumption to 20%, and the
EE Directive (adopted in 2012) pursued an indicative tar‐
get of a 20%EE improvement (EU, 2009b, 2012;Oberthür
& Pallemaerts, 2010; Rayner & Jordan, 2016). The emis‐
sion reduction target was to be upgraded to 30% if other
developed countries and more economically advanced
developing countries took comparable and adequate
action according to their responsibilities and capabilities
(an upgrade that did not materialize).
Neither the legislation nor the legislative process
provide evidence for adequate long‐term thinking. As a
result of the proposal by the Commission and sugges‐
tions by the European Parliament and the European
Council, the legislation referred to long‐term objectives
of a global GHG emission reduction of 50% and a reduc‐
tion of 60–80% for developed countries by 2050 (EU,
2009a, 2009c; European Commission, 2008a, 2008b;
European Council, 2007; European Parliament, 2008a,
2008b). However, the scientific basis of these targets
was—beyond mentioning “the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC)”—not clearly argued. Perhaps
evenmore importantly, it was unclear how the EU’s 2020
target of 20/30% would fit in the long‐term trajectory.
Overall, it would appear that the long‐term emission tar‐
gets referred to were based on the IPCC’s report from
2001 (Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change [IPCC],
2001) rather than its then most recent report (IPCC,
2007); in other words, the scientific basis was outdated.
Regarding ambition, the 20% emission reduction tar‐
get, on the one hand, significantly advances the baseline
scenario of a 5% emission increase as estimated by the
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European Environment Agency (with existing measures;
see European Environment Agency, 2007). On the other
hand, this target falls short of what—according to the
IPCC—developed countries would have had to reduce
(25–40% below 1990 levels by 2020; see IPCC, 2007) and
the EU’s fair share: Available studies taking into account
responsibility and capability suggested that the EU’s fair
share would fall into the upper part of the indicated
range (30–40%; see den Elzen & Höhne, 2008; Rogelj
et al., 2010; Winkler et al., 2009). As a result, the 20%
target closed the 35–45 percentage point gap between
the baseline (+5%) and the required emission reduc‐
tions (30–40%) by close to two‐thirds (25 of 35–45 per‐
centage points = 55%–71% advancement; see Figure 1).
An upgrade of the target to 30% would have aligned it
with the lower end of the required range: It would have
closed the gap by 78–100% (35 of 35–45 percentage
points). Additionally, the target was somewhat reduced
because ETS installations were allowed to use interna‐
tional emission credits to some extent. Several other flex‐
ibilities included in the package reduced the pressure to
reduce emissions, most importantly the possibility for
member states to bank past and borrow future emission
allowances (5%) under the Effort Sharing Decision and to
trade such allowances between them (EU, 2009a, 2009c;
Oberthür & Pallemaerts, 2010). Furthermore, free alloca‐
tion of ETS emission allowances to industries in interna‐
tional competition has been subject to criticism for slow‐
ing down emission reductions (Oberthür & Pallemaerts,
2010). Counterbalancing these effects, action on RE and
EE has served to bolster emission reduction efforts. As a
result, an overachievement of the 20% target was soon
projected (European Environment Agency, 2010).
Following Oberthür (2019), the 2020 Package pos‐
sesses a relatively high degree of stringency. It is firmly
rooted in instruments of EU law (regulations, directives,
decisions). Member states have binding national targets
for both emissions (under the Effort Sharing Decision)
and RE (under the RE Directive), and emissions of indus‐
try and the power sector are directly controlled under
the ETS Directive. The package combines these pre‐
cise substantive obligations with procedural obligations,
including for member states to elaborate plans and
report on implementation and progress. The key obliga‐
tions are, with some circumscribed limitations, precise
and prescriptive with few flexibilities. Finally, the pack‐
age can in large part rely on the general accountability
and implementationmechanisms under EU law, in partic‐
ular infringement proceedings. In addition, it possesses
several specific means, such as evaluation of progress
by the Commission, penalties for non‐compliance under
the ETS and specific consequences for any member
state exceeding its emission allocation under the Effort
Sharing Decision: a deduction of 1.08 tonnes of CO2 for
every excess tonne, the requirement to develop a correc‐
tive action plan, and a temporary suspension to transfer
emission allocations to another member state (Lacasta
et al., 2010; Oberthür, 2019).
Lastly, the package included few measures towards
adaptability. Most importantly, the 2020 emission reduc‐
tion target could be raised to 30% if other developed
countries and economically more advanced developing
countries committed to taking strong action (see above).
This would happen through the ordinary legislative pro‐
cedure. Furthermore, several provisions for revising the
different elements of the package were included; for
example, the Commission could make additional legisla‐
tive proposals to help the member states achieve their
commitments under the Effort Sharing Decision after
assessing its overall implementation (EU, 2009c, Art. 6).
However, there was no clear schedule for the review
and further strengthening of existing targets and mea‐
sures and no clear link with science as a benchmark in
this respect.
Overall, the 2020 Package displayed a relative far‐
sightedness. The 2020 emission target closed the gap
between the baseline scenario and the ideal scenario by
about two‐thirds, while a relatively high degree of strin‐
gency supported its effective implementation. To the lim‐
ited extent that the Package reflected a long‐term per‐
spective, it was based on outdated science. At the same
time, it lacked a dedicated ratchetingmechanism (so that
no upgrading of the target was considered even though
the 20% reduction was already realized in 2014).
3.2. 2030 Framework
Initiated in 2013/2014 and concluded in 2018/2019,
the 2030 Framework aimed at a GHG emission reduc‐
tion of at least 40% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.
The framework contained the amended ETS Directive
(43% reduction compared to 2005) and the Effort Sharing
Regulation (30% reduction compared to 2005), comple‐
mented by the amended RE Directive with a target of
32% for the share of RE in final energy consumption
and the EE Directive with a target of a 32.5% improve‐
ment in EE (Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). Other new key
instruments included the LULUCF Regulation and the
Governance Regulation, alongside a set of revisions of
instruments governing the electricity market (EU, 2018b,
2018d; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020).
A certain degree of long‐term thinking is reflected in
the legislation (especially in the Effort Sharing Regulation,
the ETS Directive, and the Governance Regulation).
Referring to the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global
temperature increase to 2 °C (preferably 1.5 °C), the EU
set out to reach an 80–95% emission reduction by 2050,
net‐zero as early as possible and negative emissions
thereafter (EU, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d). Having
said that, the pathway towards the 2050 goal, how
the 40% target fits in it, and the scientific basis for it
(beyond stating “in the context of the IPCC”) remain
unspecified. While the 80–95% emission reduction in
effect stems from the IPCC’s 2007 report (and hence was
again quite dated; see IPCC, 2007), the long‐term tar‐
gets included had been proposed by the Commission and
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the European Parliament (European Commission, 2016;
European Parliament, 2017, 2018). The Parliament even
argued for net‐zero emissions by 2050 and negative emis‐
sions thereafter, and it proposed to task the European
Commissionwith calculating a global carbon budget, and
the EU’s fair share in it, to guide the long‐term trajectory
(European Parliament, 2018).
We consider that the 2030 emission target closed
the gap to what would ideally be required by less than
half. As the IPCC did not formulate any benchmark miti‐
gation ranges for 2030, we have derived them from sce‐
narios that take either both responsibility and capabil‐
ity or at least capability into account (see Section 2).
We have identified five scenarios that have applied these
equity principles to calculate the EU’s fair share, out of
a wider range of scenarios using varying or no equity
principles. They encompassed a range from 52.4% to
90% GHG emission reduction compared to 1990 levels
(Averchenkova et al., 2014; Meinshausen et al., 2015;
Robiou du Pont et al., 2017). Since the three middle
scenarios fell within a range of 64% to 67.9% emission
reduction, we consider 60–70% an ideal range for the EU.
According to the European Environment Agency, mea‐
sures existing prior to the first pronouncement of the
40% reduction target in 2014 would have resulted in a
baseline emission reduction of 22% by 2030 (European
Environment Agency, 2014). Consequently, the adopted
40% target closed 37.5–47.4% of the gap between the
baseline (22%) and the required target range (60–70%;
see Figure 1).
Furthermore, the strengthened RE and EE tar‐
gets (and accompanying rules) have been balanced
by enhanced flexibilities. The 2030 Framework intro‐
duced several additional flexibilities, while largely keep‐
ing existing flexibilities or even expanding them (e.g., an
increased borrowing limit of 10% between 2021–2025).
In particular, member states were allowed to offset a
certain amount of their emissions under the effort shar‐
ing with ETS allowances (up to 100 million allowances)
and LULUCF credits (up to 280 million net removals; EU,
2018c; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). If fully exploited, the
LULUCF credits could reduce the 40% target by close to
three percentage points. In contrast, the Commission
calculated that the full implementation of the RE and
EE targets should lead to a significant overachievement
of the 40% emission target toward 45–46% (European
Commission, 2018; Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020).
At the same time, the stringency of the 2030
Framework is at a similar level as that of the 2020
Package (EU, 2018e, 2018f; Oberthür, 2019). On the
one side, the bindingness suffered a set‐back with the
replacement of binding national targets for RE with a
collectively binding target at the EU level. On the other
side, the Governance Regulation strengthened mem‐
ber states’ procedural obligations to prepare integrated
National Energy and Climate Plans (including details on
policies and measures) and long‐term strategies as well
as to report on progress in implementation (EU, 2018d;
Kulovesi & Oberthür, 2020). Also, it upgraded the powers
of the European Commission to monitor and promote
implementation, and introduced a formula for the cal‐
culation of indicative national RE targets. Overall, these
opposing trends can be considered to have cancelled
each other out so that the stringency remained largely
at the same level (Oberthür, 2019).
Furthermore, advancing beyond the 2020 Package,
the 2030 Framework introduced a schedule for review
and potential upward revision of the package (EU,
2018d; Torney & O’Gorman, 2020). Strongly linked to
the five‐year global stocktake under the Paris Agreement
in which countries collectively assess their progress
towards the agreement’s goals, the various legislative
instruments foresee a review and potential upgrade
around 2023 (and every five years thereafter). In addi‐
tion, the Governance Regulation establishes that
National Energy and Climate Plans are regularly updated
and further developed every five years and requires the
Commission to prepare a long‐term strategy for the EU.
This constitutes an opening for more long‐term planning
and the embedding of periodic reviews into a long‐term
decarbonization trajectory—without yet providing for
such a trajectory and a related process that would clearly
establish science as a benchmark (EU, 2018d; Kulovesi &
Oberthür, 2020; Torney & O’Gorman, 2020).
Overall, the myopia of the 2030 Framework can,
despite some opposing trends, be considered to have
increased compared with the 2020 Package. The mitiga‐
tion ambition pursued closes the gap towards effective
climate protection in a long‐term perspective less than
half (down from about two‐thirds) and was further soft‐
ened by newly introduced flexibilities and offsets. While
its stringency remained roughly at the same level, the
2030 Framework did progress on adaptability by estab‐
lishing a ratcheting mechanism, which can be linked to a
stronger explicit reflection on a longer‐term perspective
in the policy process and its output. This positive devel‐
opment remains, however, insufficient for balancing the
significant regress on mitigation ambition.
3.3. European Green Deal
Launched by the von der Leyen Commission in 2019
as the EU’s growth strategy to make its economy sus‐
tainable, the EGD aims at reaching climate neutrality
(net‐zero emissions) by 2050. As a central piece of the
EGD, the Council and the European Parliament agreed
on a European Climate Law in April 2021 (EU, 2021).
This Climate Law enshrines an enhanced GHG emission
reduction target for 2030 of 55% and the 2050 climate‐
neutrality target. A fuller legislative package implement‐
ing the 2030 target (known as the “Fit for 55” package),
including revisions of the ETS Directive, the Effort Sharing
Regulation, the RE and EE Directives, was proposed in
July 2021 and remains to be adopted at the time of
writing. Thus, the analysis in this section focuses on the
ambition, the long‐term perspective and the ratcheting
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mechanism addressed in the Climate Law,while the strin‐
gency of the governance framework will largely depend
on the Fit for 55 package still to be enacted.
The Climate Law more strongly reflects long‐term
thinking than the 2030 Framework, but still leaves room
for significant further improvement. First, the Law binds
the mid‐term 2030 emission reduction target of net
55% together with the long‐term 2050 climate‐neutrality
target, along with a prospect of achieving negative
emissions thereafter (EU, 2021). However, the pathway
towards net‐zero emissions in 2050 and the logic for
the 2030 target on the trajectory to 2050 remains to be
specified. Also, beyond general references to the IPCC
1.5 °C Report (IPCC, 2018), it is not clear how the new
targets align with science. This outcome resulted from
the slightly diverging positions of the European insti‐
tutions involved in the legislative process (Council of
the European Union, 2020; European Commission, 2020;
European Parliament, 2020). Especially the European
Parliament argued for further strengthening the long‐
term perspective by requesting each member state to
achieve negative emissions from 2051, and determining
a Union carbon budget of 48 Gt CO2 equivalent for the
period 2018–2050 (based on prior Commission calcula‐
tions). Nevertheless, similar to the other institutions, the
exact scientific basis for its long‐term objectives was not
further specified.
Concerning ambition, the heightened 2030 emission
reduction target enhances farsightedness compared to
the 2030 Framework, even though the baseline has
increased in the meantime. Since the EGD emerged
shortly after the finalization of the 2030 Framework,
the same studies remain relevant. Hence, the EU’s
2030 emission reduction target should have ideally
amounted to 60–70%. At the same time, the base‐
line scenario increased to 36% by 2030 because of
the progress in implementing the 2030 Framework
(European Environment Agency, 2019). Therefore, the
55% target closes 55.9–79.2% of the gap between the
baseline (36%) and the required target range (60–70%;
see Figure 1). However, the gap closure is somewhat
reduced because the 55% constitute a “net” target:
The Climate Law allows the crediting of LULUCF removals
of up to 225 Mt CO2 so that the 55% target translates
into an actual emission cut of 52.8% (EU, 2021). At the
same time, the magnitude of the allowed LULUCF cred‐
its is somewhat lower than in the 2030 Framework.
Furthermore, the Climate Law includes the require‐
ment for the Commission to assess the consistency
of each draft measure or legislative proposal with the
climate‐neutrality objective. Other flexibilities cannot be
assessed yet since they will only be discussed as part of
the further implementing legislation.
Concerning stringency, the Climate Law makes the
2030 and 2050 emission targets legally binding. While
discussions so far would not point to a significant
deviation from the existing stringency of the gover‐
nance framework, relevant other aspects cannot be
assessed yet as the implementing legislation is still
under development.
Finally, the Climate Law further strengthens the exist‐
ing ratcheting mechanism and thus the adaptability
of the legislation. The schedule for review and poten‐
tial upward revision of the legislation in line with the
quintennial global stocktakes of the Paris Agreement is
maintained. In addition, the Climate Law requires the
Commission to formulate an emission reduction target
for 2040 within six months after the first global stock‐
take in 2023, accompanied by an indicative Union GHG
emission budget for 2030–2050 (EU, 2021). This 2040
target can be revised within six months of the second
global stocktake in 2028. Lastly, a European Scientific
Advisory Board will be established to provide scientific
advice on the EU’s existing and proposed measures, tar‐
gets and GHG emission budget. Additionally, member
states are invited to establish their own national climate
advisory bodies.
Overall, the EGD thus seems to increase the farsight‐
edness of EU CEP somewhat beyond the level of the
2020 Package. To be sure, the 2030 emission reduc‐
tion target of 55% only achieves about the same level
of alignment with the ideal ambition as the 2020 tar‐
get of 20% (assuming stringency will remain roughly
stable in the upcoming further implementing legisla‐
tion). It is the process‐related elements—the maturing
of the long‐term perspective and the strengthening of
the ratcheting mechanism—that elevate the EGD above
the 2020 Package. This assessment hinges on retaining
the prior ideal ambition (of the 2030 Framework), which
may be questioned given the increasing focus on limit‐
ing global temperature increase to 1.5 °C after the Paris
Agreement and the IPCC1.5 °C report (IPCC, 2018).When
we calibrate the emission target toward a 1.5 °C warming
scenario, the EGDwould appear to be evenmoremyopic.
In this case, the EU’s ideal targets for 2030 and 2050may
have to be increased to 77–87% and to more than 140%
(i.e., negative emissions) respectively (Robiou du Pont
et al., 2017). As a result, the 55% target would only close
the gap to the ideal emission reduction by some 37–46%
(19 of 41–51 percentage points).
3.4. Results
The alignment of the EU’s mid‐term GHG emission tar‐
gets with long‐term requirements has fluctuated signifi‐
cantly from the 2020 Package to the EGD (see Figure 1).
Despite the doubling of the nominal mid‐term emis‐
sion target from 20% by 2020 to at least 40% by
2030, the 2030 target was less aligned with long‐term
requirements (see Figure 1). Additionally, whereas the
design of the 2020 Package ensured a significant over‐
achievement of the 20% emission target, the 2030
Framework enhanced the flexibilities (in particular by
including LULUCF offsets) so that a full realization or
even an overachievement of the 40% emission reduc‐
tion remained uncertain. Accordingly, the shortsight‐



















Figure 1. EU mid‐term GHG emission targets: closure of gap between baseline scenario and ideal target (100% = complete
closure).
edness of the mid‐term emission target of the 2030
Framework may be considered to have been close to
double that of the 2020 Package (60% gap versus 30%
gap). The significant upgrade of the 2030 target to 55%
under the EGD may only re‐establish the level of far‐
sightedness of the 2020 target, especially considering
the reinforced inclusion of LULUCF removals. Admittedly,
complementary elements required for a more complete
assessment of the revised 2030 target under the EGD
(including amendments to the rules governing the ETS,
the effort sharing, RE and EE) are still to emerge from
the further implementing legislation to be elaborated
from mid‐2021.
According to our assessment, the stringency of EU
CEP has, so far, neither reinforced nor balanced the ups
and downs in shortsightedness of ambition (see Table 1).
Changes from the 2020 Package to the 2030 Framework
have entailed both a weakening (e.g., Union target RE)
and a strengthening of stringency (e.g., more procedural
obligations), which seem to largely balance each other.
We need to caution, though, that the assessment of
the EGD necessarily remains incomplete on this aspect
Table 1. Evolution of the shortsightedness of the EU’s climate and energy policy.
2020 Package 2030 Framework Climate Law
Closure of gap
between baseline 55–71% 37.5–47.4% 55.9–79.2%
and ideal scenario
Stringency Relatively high
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as well, as it depends on the forthcoming implement‐
ing legislation.
At the same time, a long‐term perspective and
adaptability have seen steady growth over time (see
Table 1). Long‐term thinking has become more promi‐
nent in the legislation and the underlying positions of
the European institutions from the 2020 Package, culmi‐
nating in the inclusion of the 2050 climate‐neutrality tar‐
get in the European Climate Law. Furthermore, the 2030
Framework introduced scheduled reviews and upward
revisions, which has been further strengthened in the
EGD’s Climate Law that frames a process for the estab‐
lishment of a 2040 target as well as a GHG emission
budget. It also promises to strengthen the link with
science—a significant gap so far—through the creation
of a European Scientific Advisory Body.
Overall, our assessment indicates that while the
shortsightedness of EU CEP has evolved significantly, it
has decreased far less than the development of the nom‐
inal mid‐term emission targets might suggest. The sub‐
stantive farsightedness of the EGD only re‐established
the levels of the 2020 Package (making good on the
regression of the 2030 Framework). It is primarily due
to the maturing of long‐term thinking and the strength‐
ening of the ratcheting mechanism, that EU CEP under
the EGD can be considered less myopic than the 2020
Package (although the assessment remains preliminary
pending the adoption of further implementing legisla‐
tion). Additionally, using a 1.5°C warming scenario as the
ideal scenario significantly increases the level of myopia
of the EGD (and potentially also of the 2030 Framework).
This raises the questionwhether such ideal levels of emis‐
sion reduction are feasible domestically or whether they
would require international action.
4. Conclusion
Our analysis reveals that the level of myopia of EU
CEP displays significant variation over time. “Substantive
myopia” (including the emission target and the strin‐
gency of accompanying policies) has decreased from the
2020 Package to the 2030 Framework before increasing
under the EGD to levels comparable to the 2020 Package.
In contrast, process‐related elements (long‐term per‐
spective and adaptability) have advanced more linearly
over time, while still leaving significant room for improve‐
ment. It remains to be seen whether the progress on
adaptability will be able to overcome the enduring
myopia of EU CEP. As time is running out to avoid the
worst impacts of climate change, it may be questionable
whether any future ratcheting can still catch up.
These findings make a significant contribution to
both the literature on EU climate policy and research
on temporal asymmetries, time inconsistencies and
(democratic) myopia. It provides a novel perspective
on EU climate policy that enables a diachronic assess‐
ment of policy development over time, properly inte‐
grating a long‐term perspective that pays attention to
time (in)consistency, which is central in climate pol‐
icy. It also advances a systematic investigation of the
level of myopia of (climate) policy as an essential basis
for research on temporal asymmetries/inconsistencies
and “democratic” myopia, thereby enabling compar‐
isons across countries and across time as an important
basis for advancing explanatory analyses.
A logical next step in advancing the research pre‐
sented in this article may be the investigation of the
driving forces of short‐ and farsightedness in general
and with respect to EU CEP in particular. The afore‐
mentioned literatures on time asymmetries and demo‐
cratic myopia might suggest a focus on institutional fac‐
tors, whereas underlying interests and politics may also
come into focus. For example, we might investigate in
further detail the positions of the European institutions
involved and the underlying politics as drivers of myopia.
We may also scrutinize to what extent the applicable
institutional procedures and structures have furtheredor
permitted a more science‐based long‐term perspective
as opposed to more short‐term political considerations.
We are hopeful that our analysis creates a solid founda‐
tion for advancing such research to gain a deeper under‐
standing ofmyopia in EU (climate) policymaking and how
to overcome it.
Acknowledgments
This article has been prepared in the context of the
Jean Monnet Network “Governing the EU’s Climate
and Energy Transition in Turbulent Times” (GOVTRAN—
www.govtran.eu) with the support of the Erasmus+ pro‐
gramme of the European Union, as well as the VUB’s
strategic research programme Evaluating Democratic
Governance in Europe (EDGE). We would like to thank
the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful com‐
ments and Didier Caluwaerts for his assistance in devel‐
oping the framework.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Averchenkova, A., Stern, N., & Zenghelis, D. (2014).
Taming the beasts of ‘burden‐sharing’: An analysis
of equitable mitigation actions and approaches to
2030 mitigation pledges (Policy Paper). Grantham
Research Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment.
Beckman, L. (2008). Do global climate change and the
interest of future generations have implications for
democracy? Environmental Politics, 17(4), 610–624.
Boasson, E. L., & Wettestad, J. (2013). EU climate policy.
Industry, policy interaction and external environment.
Ashgate Publishing.
Brun, A. (2016). Conference diplomacy: The making of
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 337–347 345
the Paris Agreement. Politics and Governance, 4(3),
115–123.
Burns, C. (2019). In the eye of the storm? The European
Parliament, the environment and the EU’s crises.
Journal of European Integration, 41(3), 311–327.
Climate Action Tracker. (2019). Governments still show‐
ing little sign of acting on climate crisis.Warming pro‐
jections global update. December 2019 (Policy Brief).
Council of the European Union. (2020). General
approach European Climate Law (14171/20).
Cseh, A. (2019). Aligning climate action with the self‐
interest and short‐term dominated priorities of
decision‐makers. Climate Policy, 19(2), 139–146.
Delbeke, J., & Vis, P. (2019). Towards a climate‐neutral
Europe. Routledge.
Delreux, T., & Happaerts, S. (2016). Environmental pol‐
icy and politics in the European Union. Palgrave
Macmillan.
Dryzek, J. S., & Niemeyer, S. (2019). Deliberative
democracy and climate governance. Nature Human
Behaviour, 3(5), 411–413.
Dupont, C. (2016). Climate policy integration into EU
energy policy. Progress and prospects. Routledge.
den Elzen, M., & Höhne, N. (2008). Reductions of green‐
house gas emissions in Annex I and non‐Annex I coun‐
tries for meeting concentration stabilisation targets:
An editorial comment. Climatic Change, 91(3/4),
249–274.
EU. (2009a). Effort sharing decision (406/2009/EC).
EU. (2009b). Renewable energy directive (2009/28/EC).
EU. (2009c). ETS directive (2009/29/EC).
EU. (2012). Energy efficiency directive (2012/27/EU).
EU. (2018a). ETS directive ((EU) 2018/410).
EU. (2018b). LULUCF regulation ((EU) 2018/841).
EU. (2018c). Effort sharing regulation ((EU) 2018/842).
EU. (2018d). Governance regulation ((EU) 2018/1999).
EU. (2018e). Renewable energy directive ((EU)
2018/2001).
EU. (2018f). Energy efficiency directive ((EU) 2018/2002).
EU. (2021). European climate law ((EU) 2021/1119).
European Commission. (2008a). Proposal ETS directive
(52008PC0016).
European Commission. (2008b). Proposal effort sharing
decision (52008PC0017).
European Commission. (2016). Proposal effort sharing
regulation (52016PC0482).
European Commission. (2018). EU and the Paris Climate
Agreement: Taking stock of progress at Katowice COP
(52018DC0716).
European Commission. (2020). Proposal European cli‐
mate law (52020PC0080).
European Council. (2007). Presidency conclusions
(7224/1/07).
European Environment Agency. (2007). Greenhouse gas
emission trends and projections in Europe 2007.
Tracking progress towards Kyoto targets.
European Environment Agency. (2010). Tracking
progress towards Kyoto and 2020 targets in Europe.
European Environment Agency. (2014). Trends and pro‐
jections in Europe 2014. Tracking progress towards
Europe’s climate and energy targets for 2020.
European Environment Agency. (2019). Trends and pro‐
jections in Europe 2019. Tracking progress towards
Europe’s climate and energy targets.
European Parliament. (2008a). Report ETS directive (A6‐
0406/2008).
European Parliament. (2008b).Report effort sharing deci‐
sion (A6‐0411/2008).
European Parliament. (2017). Amendments effort shar‐
ing decision (P8_TA(2017)0256).
European Parliament. (2018). Amendments governance
regulation (P8_TA(2018)0011).
European Parliament. (2020). Amendments European cli‐
mate law (P9_TA(2020)0253).
Finnegan, J. (2019). Institutions, climate change, and
the foundations of long‐term policymaking (Work‐
ing Paper). Grantham Research Institute on Climate
Change and the Environment.
Galaz, V. (2019). Time and politics in the Anthropocene:
Too fast, too slow? In F. Biermann & E. Lövbrand
(Eds.), Anthropocene encounters. New directions in
green political thinking (pp. 109–127). Cambridge
University Press.
Grant, N., Hawkes, A., Napp, T., & Gambhir, A. (2020).
The appropriate use of reference scenarios in
mitigation analysis. Nature Climate Change, 10(7),
605–610.
Hayward, T. (2012). Climate change and ethics. Nature
Climate Change, 2(12), 843–848.
Hovi, J., Sprinz, D. F., & Underdal, A. (2009). Implement‐
ing long‐term climate policy: Time inconsistency,
domestic politics, international anarchy. Global Envi‐
ronmental Politics, 9(3), 20–39.
Howlett, M., & Mukherjee, I. (2018). Routledge hand‐
book of policy design. Routledge.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2001). Cli‐
mate change 2001.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2007). Cli‐
mate change 2007.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2018).
Global warming of 1.5°C.
Jacobs, A. M. (2016). Policy making for the long term in
advanced democracies.Annual Reviewof Political Sci‐
ence, 19(1), 433–454.
Kulovesi, K., & Oberthür, S. (2020). Assessing the
EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework:
Incremental change toward radical transformation?
Review of European, Comparative & International
Environmental Law, 29(2), 151–166.
Lacasta, N., Oberthür, S., Santos, E., & Barata, P. (2010).
From sharing the burden to sharing the effort: Deci‐
sion 406/2009/EC on member state emission tar‐
gets for non‐ETS sectors. In S. Oberthür & M. Palle‐
maerts (Eds.), The new climate policies of the Euro‐
pean Union. Internal legislation and climate diplo‐
macy (pp. 93–116). Brussels University Press.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 337–347 346
Levin, K., Cashore, B., Bernstein, S., & Auld, G. (2012).
Overcoming the tragedy of super wicked problems:
Constraining our future selves to ameliorate global
climate change. Policy Sciences, 45(2), 123–152.
Machin, A. (2019). Democracy and agonism in the
Anthropocene: The challenges of knowledge,
time and boundary. Environmental Values, 28(3),
347–365.
Mackenzie,M. K. (2016). Institutional design and sources
of short‐termism. In I. González‐Ricoy & A. Gosseries
(Eds.), Institutions for future generations (pp. 24–48).
Oxford University Press.
McLaren, D. (2020). Quantifying the potential scale of
mitigation deterrence from greenhouse gas removal
techniques. Climatic Change, 162(4), 2411–2428.
Meinshausen, M., Jeffery, L., Guetschow, J., Robiou Du
Pont, Y., Rogelj, J., Schaeffer, M., Höhne, N., den
Elzen, M., Oberthür, S., & Meinshauses, N. (2015).
National post‐2020 greenhouse gas targets and
diversity‐aware leadership. Nature Climate Change,
5(12), 1098–1106.
Oberthür, S., & Pallemaerts, M. (2010). The new climate
policies of the European Union. VUB Press.
Oberthür, S. (2019). Hard or soft governance? The EU’s
Climate and Energy Policy Framework for 2030. Poli‐
tics and Governance, 7(1), 17–27.
Robiou du Pont, Y., Jeffery, L., Gütshow, J., Rogelj, J.,
Christoff, P., & Meinshausen, M. (2017). Equitable
mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement goals.
Nature Climate Change, 7(1), 38–43.
Rayner, T., & Jordan, A. (2016). Climate change policy in
the EuropeanUnion. InOxford research encyclopedia
of climate science. Oxford University Press.
Rogelj, J., Chen, C., Nabel, J., Macey, K., Hare, W., Scha‐
effer, M., Markmann, K., Höhne, N., Krogh Ander‐
sen, K., & Meinshausen, M. (2010). Analysis of the
Copenhagen accord pledges and its global climatic
impacts—A snapshot of dissonant ambitions. Envi‐
ronmental Research Letters, 5(3), Article 034013.
Torney, D., & O’Gorman, R. (2020). Adaptability versus
certainty in a carbon emissions reduction regime: An
assessment of the EU’s 2030 climate and energy pol‐
icy framework. RECIEL, 29, 167–176.
Williston, B. (2019). The ethics of climate change: An
introduction. Routledge.
Winkler, H., Vorster, S., & Marquard, A. (2009). Who
picks up the remainder?Mitigation in developed and
developing countries. Climate Policy, 9(6), 634–651.
About the Authors
JanaGheuens is a PhD researcher at the Brussels School of Governance at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
Her PhD project explores the shortsightedness of the EU’s climate and energy governance as part of
the Vrije Universiteit Brussel’s Evaluating Democratic Governance in Europe (EDGE) programme.
Sebastian Oberthür is professor of environment and sustainable development at the Brussels School
of Governance at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and professor of environmental policy and law at the
Centre for Climate Change, Energy and Environmental Law at the University of Eastern Finland. Since
the early 1990s, Sebastian has contributed to scholarship on a broad range of issues relating to inter‐
national and European environmental, climate and energy governance.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 337–347 347
